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Abstract
The issue of the persistence of monopoly when at least one labour-managed
…rm takes part in an auction for a cost-reducing innovation is tackled in this
paper. It is shown that (i) when the incumbent is a pro…t-maximizing …rm
while the entrant is a labour-managed …rm, monopoly persists; (ii) when both
…rms are labour-managed, monopoly persists only if the technology initially
employed by the incumbent is highly ine¢cient as compared to the new one;
and, …nally, (iii) when the incumbent is labour-managed while the outsider
is a pro…t seeking agent, then entry always occurs and monopoly changes
hands.
JEL classi…cation: D92, L13, L20, O31
Keywords: auction, process innovation, persistence of monopoly, e¢-
ciency e¤ect, labour-managed …rms
1 Introduction
The well-known Schumpeterian hypothesis (Schumpeter, 1942) concerning
the superior ability of a monopolist to achieve technological progress as com-
pared to a population of smaller competitors has given rise to a wide debate
over the decades, with a large number of in‡uential contributions in favour
or against Schumpeter’s claim.1 A subset of this debate is the literature,
stemming from the seminal contribution of Gilbert and Newbery (1982) and
Reinganum (1983), on the persistence of monopoly when …rms compete for
a cost-reducing innovation. All these contributions focus on pro…t maximiz-
ing …rms. Gilbert and Newbery (1982) investigate the issue by modelling
a situation where a process innovation for an existing product is auctioned
to the highest bidder to be selected between an incumbent and a potential
entrant, under certainty. Reinganum (1983) introduces uncertainty. Two
e¤ects contribute in deciding whether monopoly persists or the entrant ac-
quires the property right on the innovation, so that a duopoly regime takes
place. The …rst is the so-called ”e¢ciency e¤ect”, relying on the comparison
between the pro…t incentives for the two …rms to bid for the innovation. This
e¤ect works in favour of the incumbent, since a monopolist operating at the
lowest average cost available on the basis of the new technology is surely
better o¤ than two duopolists when these operate with the same technology,
and, a fortiori, when one of them operates with an inferior technology. The
second e¤ect is the so-called ”replacement e¤ect”, taking into account the
fact that the entrant starts from scratch while the monopolist can at best
replace herself. This works in favour of the entrant, in that the incumbent
may in some circumstances ”rest on her laurels”. The contribution of Gilbert
and Newbery (1982) features only the …rst e¤ect, so that they conclude in
favour of the persistence of monopoly. On the basis of the interaction of both
e¤ects, Reinganum (1983) claims that both persistence and the arising of a
duopoly regime are plausible outcomes of the auction, the latter being the
case if the replacement e¤ect is large enough to outweigh the e¢ciency e¤ect.
Variations and extensions have been provided later on by Harris and Vickers
(1985); Leininger (1991); Lippman and Mamer (1992); Krishna (1993); and
Yi (1995), inter alia. Each of these contributions o¤ers some new insights as
to the way the auction as well as the bidding process can be modelled, and
1See, inter alia, Arrow (1962), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), and the exhaustive surveys
by Gilbert (1989) and Reinganum (1989).
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highlights the role of factors such as the evolution of strategic interaction
over time, the presence of budget constraints, the availability of productive
capacity over time or the degree of sunkness characterizing the R&D e¤orts in
determining the outcome of the auction and, consequently, market structure.
The persistence result obtained by Gilbert and Newbery (1982) relies on
the fact that, when only strict pro…t maximizing behaviour is accounted for,
a monopolist gains larger pro…ts than the whole industry would do under
oligopoly, if all …rms avail of the same technology. Hence, the same must
hold, a fortiori, in the case where the monopolist operates with the most ef-
…cient technology around. As a consequence, an auction where the patent on
a cost-reducing innovation is o¤ered to the highest bidder is bound to assign
it to the monopolist. How about situations where at least one …rm is not
aiming at pro…t maximization? This is the case when labour-managed …rms
are involved, their aim being the maximization of value added per worker.
Three alternative settings can be envisaged, where (i) both the incumbent
and the potential entrant are labour-managed …rms; (ii) the incumbent is an
entrepreneurial …rm, while the entrant is employee-controlled; and, …nally,
(iii) the incumbent is a labour managed-…rm, while the entrant is entrepre-
neurial.
The existing view on labour-managed …rms is twofold. On the one hand,
if partnership and labour force do not coincide, the maximization of value
added is obtained through the adjustment of variables that include the size
of labour force itself. This yields the well known ”perverse” behaviour of
labour-managed …rms in response to a price increase in the output market
(see, inter alia, Vanek, 1970; Meade, 1972; Ireland, 1987; Cremer and Cre-
mer, 1992; Delbono and Rossini, 1992; Stewart, 1991 and 1992; Lambertini,
1996; Lambertini and Rossini, 1998). On the other, an enterprise whose
workers are the residual claimants over …rm’s income, i.e., where they coin-
cide with partners by statute, is not subject to this ”perversion” in that the
size of the partnership/labour force is not among the variables being adjusted
to maximize value added. Instead, membership is decided upon through a
voting mechanism (Sertel, 1982, 1987). By now it is widely recognised that
most of the workers’ enterprises we can observe …t into the latter picture.2
Here, I focus on a setting where a labor-managed …rm’s membership is
a¤ected by the process of value added maximization. The analysis carried
2A well known instance is AVIS Car Rental. The same holds for many law …rms and
consulting …rms.
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out in the remainder of the paper stresses that since a direct measure of
success is the pro…t level, pro…t-maximizing behaviour is neatly prevailing
in terms of its ability to achieve technical progress and entry, if the latter
is a direct consequence of the former. This points to a dynamic ine¢ciency
of labour-managed units, adding up to their well-known static ine¢ciency,
with the caveat that considering workers’ enterprises where members are
also residual claimants over …rm’s income would certainly mitigate if not
completely eliminate both ine¢ciencies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the basic settings and brie‡y describes the monopoly equilibria, together
with the setting where a pro…t-maximizing incumbent faces an entry threat
by a labour-managed outsider. The case of competition between labour-
managed …rms is dealt with in section 3. Section 4 describes the situation
where a labour-managed incumbent and a pro…t-seeking entrant compete for
the innovation. Section 5 contains an overall assessment of results. Finally,
section 6 provides concluding remarks.
2 The setup
At the outset, the market is being served by a monopolist producing a single
good, whose inverse demand function is
p = a¡ x; (1)
where p is the price and x is the output level. Technology requires labour
only, according to the production function x = °
p
L, so that the marginal
product of labour is decreasing, and L = cx2; where c = 1=°2: In order to
operate, each …rm must pay a …xed entry fee k, so that, if she is a pro…t-
seeking agent, her objective function is
¼Mpm(c) = px¡ cx2 ¡ k; (2)
where superscript M and subscript pm jointly identify a pro…t-maximizing
monopolist. The labour wage rate is normalized to one. Simple algebra
su¢ces to establish that the optimal output is xMpm = a=2(1 + c) and the
equilibrium pro…t amounts to ¼Mpm(c) = (a
2 ¡ 4k ¡ 4kc)=4(1 + c):
If instead the …rm is a labour-managed one, she aims at setting the output
(or …xing the price) so as to maximize value added per worker, i.e.,
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V Mlm (c) =
px¡ k
cx2
; (3)
this being achieved at xMlm = 2k=a. Subscript lm stands for labour-managed.
In equilibrium, the value added per worker amounts to V Mlm (c) = (a
2 ¡
4k)=4ck, while …rm’s pro…ts are ¼Mlm = k(a
2 ¡ 4k ¡ 4ck)=a2, implying the
overall constraint c < (a2 ¡ 4k)=4k: It can then be easily established that
¼Mpm > ¼
M
lm in the admissible range of parameters.
Assume a cost-reducing innovation obtained by an independent labora-
tory, such that the good can be produced at unit cost c 2 [0; c), becomes
available. In the present model, such innovation can be interpreted as en-
hancing labour productivity through an increase in °: A patent of in…nite
duration over the new technology is auctioned to the highest bidder between
the incumbent and a potential entrant. If the outsider acquires the prop-
erty rights over the innovation, a duopoly arises, with the following market
demand function:
p = a¡ xI ¡ xE ; (4)
where superscripts I and E identify the incumbent and the entrant, respec-
tively. If entry occurs, simultaneous Cournot competition takes place. It can
be easily shown that, notwithstanding the maximand of a labour-managed
…rm is value added per worker, the measure of her ability to bid for an
innovation is still represented by pro…t. Consider what follows. De…ne as
V jlm = (px
j
lm ¡ k)=(cxilm); j = E; I;M ; c 2 fc; cg ; the value added per
worker when the labour-managed …rm is, alternatively, the outside bidder,
the incumbent, or the monopolist. According to the generic worker’s partic-
ipation constraint, the individual value added must be higher than the wage
available as an outside option. As a consequence, the maximum amount
of resources any member could be asked to forgo without exiting the …rm is
V jlm¡1, given that the wage is normalized to one. In the aggregate, this yields
L(V jlm ¡ 1) = pxjlm ¡ k ¡ L = ¼jlm: Hence, in order to establish whether the
market remains monopolistic or instead is bound to become a duopoly, one
has to evaluate the e¢ciency e¤ect, as measured by the following inequality:
¼M(c) ¸ or < ¼I(c) + ¼E(c): (5)
If ¼M (c) ¸ ¼I(c) + ¼E(c), as is the case when both …rms maximize pro…ts
(Gilbert and Newbery, 1982), the incumbent operating with the new tech-
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nology is able to make at least as high a bid as the outside competitor, and
monopoly persists. A priori, this is not necessarily the case if at least one
…rm is labour-managed. However, the situation in which the incumbent is
a pro…t-maximizing agent while the entrant is labour-managed leads to a
straightforward result and can be quickly dealt with. Since ceteris paribus a
pro…t-maximizing …rm gains higher pro…ts than a labour-managed counter-
part, then it is immediate to verify that
¼Mpm(c) ¸ ¼Ipm(c) + ¼Epm(c) > ¼Ipm(c) + ¼Elm(c); (6)
so that monopoly persists, due to the fact that competition between an
employee-controlled …rm and a pro…t-seeking one entails lower overall in-
dustry pro…ts as compared to the case where all agents aim at pro…t maxi-
mization, and consequently the e¢ciency e¤ect favours the incumbent even
more than in the case described by Gilbert and Newbery (1982).3 Hence, we
have the following
Proposition 1 If a patent of in…nite duration on a cost-reducing innovation
is o¤ered to the highest bidder to be chosen between a pro…t-maximizing in-
cumbent and a labour-managed outsider, the former always wins and monopoly
persists.
3 Bidding for the innovation in a labour-managed
market
When both the incumbent and the (potential) entrant are labour-managed
…rms, in order to ascertain what the outcome of the auction is going to be,
one has to evaluate whether
¼Mlm(c) ¸ or < ¼Ilm(c) + ¼Elm(c); (7)
where ¼Mlm = k(a
2 ¡ 4k ¡ 4ck)=a2: The following result obtains:
3As shown in Okuguchi (1993) and Lambertini (1996), if …rms were able to deter-
mine the timing of moves in an extended game (Hamilton and Slutsky, 1990), the pro…t-
maximizing …rm would take the lead, while the labour-managed …rm would follow. This
would strenghten the result even further.
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Proposition 2 If a patent of in…nite duration on a cost-reducing innovation
is o¤ered to the highest bidder to be chosen between two labour-managed …rms,
monopoly persists if and only if the cost initially borne by the incumbent is
higher than a critical threshold c¤:
Proof. See the appendix.
If the technology initially employed by the incumbent is characterized by
a su¢ciently high marginal cost, the e¢ciency e¤ect favours the incumbent,
in that the gain o¤ered by the innovation is so large that it leads to the
persistence of monopoly. This can be given the following interpretation.
When a …rm maximizes pro…t, she restricts output under monopoly, while
she would increase (respectively, restrict) her output when faced with a large
(respectively, small) …rm under Cournot competition, due to the presence of
strategic substitutability in the quantity space, as described by the decreasing
reaction function characterizing a Cournot pro…t-seeker.4 If the incumbent
is a labour-managed …rm, given the nature of her objective function and the
consequent positive slope of her reaction function in duopoly, she aims at
restricting production no matter what the degree of competition is. Though,
under monopoly she restricts the output more than under duopoly, since
in the latter case the increasing reaction function pulls her in the opposite
direction, so that we end up observing that each labour-managed oligopolist
produces more than she would if she stood alone in the market place. Hence,
when it comes to her ability to compete for an innovation, she will pre-empt
the outsider if and only if the parameter a¤ecting the old marginal cost is
su¢ciently high to bring about a signi…cant loss. If this is the case, the pro…t
she would get in case of entry is low enough to drive the persistence result.
Otherwise, the tendency to lower output irrespectively of the environment,
is bound to condemn the incumbent to loose the auction and accomodate
entry.
4The concept of strategic substitutability/complementarity has been introduced by
Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985). For the comparative statics characterizing
oligopoly with pro…t-maximizing agents, see also Singh and Vives (1984) and Dixit (1986),
inter alia.
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4 Bidding for the innovation when the out-
sider is entrepreneurial
I shall now turn my attention to the case where the entrant is strictly aiming
at pro…t maximization, while the incumbent is a labour-managed …rm. The
outcome of the auction for a cost-reducing innovation is summarized by
Proposition 3 If a patent of in…nite duration on a cost-reducing innova-
tion is o¤ered to the highest bidder to be chosen between a labour-managed
incumbent and a pro…t-maximizing entrant, the latter wins and replaces the
former as a monopolist.
Proof. See the appendix.
The above result is less straightforward than that observed in the reversed
situation where the incumbent is a pro…t-seeker and the outsider is a labour-
managed …rm. However, it lends itself to an interpretation on the very same
grounds. Under Cournot competition and perfect certainty, a …rm’s ability
to bid for an innovation is directly measured by her pro…ts which, in turn, are
proportional to her output level. Since a pro…t-maximizing …rm is, by de…ni-
tion, bigger than a labour-managed one, then the latter cannot prevent entry
by the former, all the more if one observes that ultimately their respective
bids depends on their respective pro…ts should each of them stand alone in
the market with the new technology. As a last remark, it is worth observing
that the switch from a labour-managed to a pro…t-maximizing monopoly is
also socially welcome, both because of the obvious increase in output and
because that output is produced at a lower cost.
5 Discussion
As a general appraisal, it can be observed that, since bidding for an innova-
tion is proportional to the output level, the labour-managed …rm will exhibit
a poorer performance than her pro…t-seeking counterpart when it comes to
both output and technological progress. This is still another argument point-
ing at the by now well known issue of labour-managed …rms’ ine¢ciency
or ”perversion”, making the labour-managed …rm a lesser competitor to a
pro…t-maximizing …rm, than a unit of the same nature would prove to be.
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This has been highlighted by the existing literature under several respects
(see Ireland, 1987; Delbono and Rossini, 1992; Okuguchi, 1993; Lambertini,
1996; Lambertini and Rossini, 1998), one being particularly worth mention-
ing, namely, the di¤erent reaction of a pro…t-maximizing …rm to the threat
of entry. Horowitz (1991) and Stewart (1991) stress that a labour-managed
unit is somewhat a lesser evil to a pro…t-maximizing enterprise than the lat-
ter is to the former, and this entails that a pro…t-maximizing …rm would
always prefer to coexist with a relatively less aggressive labour-maximizing
counterpart than with a rival of her kind. This seems to imply that a pro…t-
seeking …rm would be more willing to accomodate (respectively, …ght) entry
by a labour-managed (pro…t-seeking) …rm, rather than by a pro…t-seeking
(labour-managed) unit. This statement solely relies upon the di¤erent de-
crease in pro…ts experienced by a pro…t-maximizing incumbent in the two
settings, because, as it is usually the case in entry models, technology is
available to all …rms and the property rights on it cannot be strategically
used to prevent entry. This, on the contrary, is the case in innovation races
and the measure of the e¢ciency e¤ect proves that it is easier for a pro…t-
maximizing incumbent to acquire the innovation when the outside competi-
tor is a relatively unaggressive labour-managed bidder. Mutatis mutandis,
a similar argument applies when roles are reversed, producing as a result a
pro…t-maximizing monopoly. Finally, if both bidders are labour-managed,
the result of the auction depends on the ex ante level of marginal cost, in
that the incumbent is in a position to achieve technological progress if she is
su¢ciently ine¢cient so as not to be tempted to ”sleep on her laurels”.
Two caveats are in order. First, the above results are the outcome of a
speci…c model and their validity under more general assumptions on demand
and cost structure remains to be investigated. This holds, in particular, for
propositions 2 and 3. Second, turning the labour-managed …rm into a work-
ers’ enterprise makes her able to …t the established norm according to which
short-run size and output must be increasing in market price (Sertel, 1982,
1987). This suggests that the dynamic ine¢ciency of labour-managed …rms
taking part in innovation races might well disappear if their members were
the claimants over the income ‡ows generated by the innovation. Analogous
considerations are likely to hold when the problem of separation between
ownership and control is considered (Stewart, 1992). Hence, the labour-
managed …rm depicted by the early theoretical approach appears to be an
unviable economic institution. This is con…rmed by casual observation, and
is all the more relevant on the policy front, when it comes to the problem
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of privatisation in industries previously served by monopoly franchised pub-
lic enterprises. This is the case, e.g., of postal service in many countries in
Europe. Under this respect, the present paper suggests that, since labour
continues to be a strong residual claimant in many of these public enter-
prises, both before and after privatisation, they may tend to behave like the
labour-managed …rms modeled in this paper. To the extent they do, their
competitors might …nd it easier to appropriate the bene…ts of technologi-
cal innovation. The consequences could be the more harmful the more such
innovations are labour-replacing, i.e., capital intensive.
6 Conclusions
The issue whether labour-managed …rms can challenge pro…t-maximizing
…rms in the …eld of technical progress has been tackled in a model of Cournot
competition under certainty. It emerges that entrepreneurial …rms do have
a drastically superior ability in achieving cost-reducing innovation. In the
light of the foregoing analysis, the threat of entry by labour-managed …rms
appears indeed weak, at least when facing a pro…t-seeking incumbent. When
instead the incumbent is of the same kind, the outsider acquires the rights
on the innovation, and consequently enters, if the cost initially borne by the
incumbent is low enough. In such a case, the gain the incumbent would
enjoy by winning represents an insu¢cient incentive to pre-empt. Thus, it
appears that the internal organization of …rms heavily a¤ects their ability
to innovate. Finally, the persistence of monopoly, changing hands from a
labour-managed to a pro…t-seeking one, in itself does not necessarily imply
a (static) ine¢ciency, provided the innovation goes along with an increase in
the output level.
Although derived under speci…c assumptions, these results, adding to
the well known short-run ine¢ciency of the labour-managed …rm, produce
some relevant policy implications and points to the need of a comprehensive
reassessment of the employee-controlled …rm in Sertel’s vein.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. I proceed in two steps. First, I show that there exists
an acceptable range of cost parameters where post-entry pro…ts are positive
for both …rms. Second, I evaluate (7) within that range.
Step I. The objective functions, when the outside competitor wins the
auction, are V I(c) = (pxI ¡ k)=[(xI)2c] and V E(c) = (pxE ¡k)=[(xE)2c]: The
…rst order conditions for individual value-added maximization yield xI =
xE = (a ¡ pa2 ¡ 8k)=2; provided k < a2=8: Moreover, xI = xE > xMlm over
the acceptable range of parameters, due to the increasing best reply function
characterizing labour-managed …rms (see Okuguchi, 1993). Substituting and
simplifying, I obtain:
¼Ilm =
[2a+ c(a¡ pa2 ¡ 8k)](a¡ pa2 ¡ 8k) + 12k
4
; (a1)
¼Elm =
[2a+ c(a¡ pa2 ¡ 8k)](a¡ pa2 ¡ 8k) + 12k
4
; (a2)
whose positivity entails the following constraint:
0 · c < c < ec = 2a(pa2 ¡ 8k ¡ a) + 12k
(a¡ pa2 ¡ 8k)2 ; (a3)
which is tighter than the constraint concerning monopoly pro…ts.
Step II. I now evaluate the sign of ¼Mlm(c)¡ ¼Ilm(c)¡ ¼Elm(c); simplifying
to:
4a2(a2 ¡ 6k) + (a+ c+ c)(a¡ pa2 ¡ 8k)2 + 4k(a2 ¡ 4k ¡ 4ck)
4a2
; (a4)
which is linear in the cost parameters, and can be solved to obtain the unique
critical threshold for c. The root of the polynomial in (a4) is
c¤ =
2[a3(2 + c)(
p
a2 ¡ 8k ¡ a) + 2a2k(5 + c) + 8k2(1 + c)]
a2(a¡ pa2 ¡ 8k)2 ; (a5)
with sign [¼Mlm(c)¡ ¼Ilm(c)¡ ¼Elm(c)] = sign [c¡ c¤]: If ec > c¤, there exists an
interval of parameters where ¼Mlm(c) ¡ ¼Ilm(c) ¡ ¼Elm(c) can have both signs,
otherwise it is always positive and monopoly persists in the admissible range.
It can be veri…ed that
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ec > c¤ i¤ c > c¤ = 4k(2 + a2) ¡ a3pa2 ¡ 8k(1¡ a)
a3
p
a2 ¡ 8k(a¡ 1)¡ 4k(a2 + 2k) : (a6)
In turn, it must be ec > c¤, which holds if k > bk = (6 ¡ a2 + apa2 ¡ 3)=9;
where bk is increasing and concave in a, with lim
a!1
bk = 1=2; bk < a2=8 8
a > 0:
Proof of Proposition 3. It su¢ces to verify that the incumbent’s post-entry
pro…ts are negative in the admissible range of cost parameters. The objective
functions are, respectively, V Ilm = (px
I
lm ¡ k)=[c(xIlm)2] and ¼Epm = pxEpm ¡
c(xEpm)
2 ¡ k: Optimal output levels in duopoly are
xIlm =
¡a(1 + 2c) +
q
a2(4c2 + 4c+ 1) + 16k(1 + c)
2
; (a7)
xEpm =
a(3¡ 2c)¡
q
a2(4c2 + 4c+ 1) + 16k(1 + c)
4(1 + c)
: (a8)
Substituting and simplifying one obtains:
¼Ilm =
f(1 + 2c)[a(3 + 2c)¡ ©]¡ 2c(1 + c)[©¡ a(1 + 2c)]g[©¡ a(1 + 2c)]
8(1 + c)
¡k;
(a9)
¼Epm =
a[a(4c2 + 4c+ 1)¡ (3 + 2c)©]
8(1 + c)
; (a10)
where © =
q
a2(4c2 + 4c+ 1) + 16k(1 + c): If the incumbent wins the auc-
tion, her pro…ts are ¼Mlm = k(a
2¡ 4k¡ 4ck)=a2; so that c < (a2 ¡4k)=4k: For
the pro…t in (a9) to be positive, the following must hold:
c < c0 =
(1 + 2c)[a(3 + 2c)¡ ©][©¡ a(1 + 2c)]¡ 8k(1 + c)
2(1 + c)[©¡ a(1 + 2c)]2 : (a11)
In turn, though, it must be that c0 > c: Simple calculations show that this is
never the case in the acceptable range of parameters. This, in combination
with the inequality ¼Mlm < ¼
M
pm; establishes the proposition.
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